Organizational Imperative: Theory and History on Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency Campaigns

The most respected theorists of counterinsurgency agree about prescriptive principles for the organization of counterinsurgency campaigns. Insurgencies and counterinsurgency campaigns are each unique (sui generis), yet the theorists help provide common principles (ceteris paribus). The theorists state that counterinsurgents achieve unity of effort through centralized organization at the top and at lower geographic echelons. They also advocate for the interventionist power assisting the host country to similarly create a parallel organization. Organization theory provides the logical basis for this prescription. Counter-organization of the population is less prescriptive and is dependent on the uniqueness (sui generis nature) of the particular campaign. Three historic case studies; Malaya, Dhofar, and Vietnam are compared to contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns; Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrate the wisdom of the theorists' prescription. Centralized organizations at the top and unified management at lower geographic echelons for both host country and interventionist power maintains unity of effort and prevents sub-organizational interests from distorting the counterinsurgency strategy. This prescriptive organization also enables the counterinsurgent to find the right solution for counter-organizing the population. The case studies further highlight the persistent organizational barriers that prevent the United States and its partners from organizing to fight and assist in counterinsurgency.