Fire for Effect: Field Artillery and Close Air Support in the Us Army

Publisher Marketing: The genesis of this work, "Fire for Effect: Field Artillery and Close Air Support in the US Army," was the controversial decision in 2001 to deploy Army combat units to Afghanistan without their supporting field artillery units. Fire for Effect provides a historical survey of the relationship between field artillery and close air support (CAS) in the US Army since World War I. A recurring theme in this survey is the desire of air operators for independence in operations. This first occurs at the organizational level in the development of strategic bombing theories and forces. The desire for independence emerges also in Air Force doctrine which stressed the importance of interdiction over CAS missions. Eventually, the Army aviation community also sought independence in the idea of the independent strike of attack helicopters, known as the deep attack. This last concept became at least partially discredited in the sands of Iraq in 2003. Independent air operations contrast with the Army's traditional combined arms concept where the arms and services work together to complement each other's strengths and cover weaknesses. The field artillery has long been a key member of the combined arms team. The Army ground commander has controlled all the elements of this team except the fixed-wing close air support. Despite the differences in theory and practice, since the 1960s the two services have developed cooperative and coordinated systems that have solved most difficulties. Over these last 40 years, much progress has also been made with the development of precision guided munitions, giving both services the ability to use point fire weapons in their delivery of CAS. As this study shows, the introduction of sophisticated precision weapons has separated CAS from artillery, creating distinct and complementary systems of fire support. Both, however, remain necessary to give the ground commander responsive and powerful fires in the broad variety of combat situations that characterize the modern battlefield. Contributor Bio:  McGrath, John J Boston native John McGrath has worked for the United States Army in one capacity or another since 1978. A retired Reserve officer, Mr. McGrath served in infantry, field artillery, and logistics units, both on active duty and as a reservist. Before coming to work at the Combat Studies Institute, he worked for four years at the US Army Center of Military History in Washington, DC, as a historian and archivist. Prior to that, Mr. McGrath worked full time for the Unites States Army Reserve in Massachusetts for more than 15 years, both as an active duty reservist and as a civilian military technician. He also served as a mobilized reservist in 1991 in Saudi Arabia with the 22d Support Command during Operation DEERT STORM as the command historian and in 1992 at the US Army Center of Military History as a research and writer. Mr. McGrath is a graduate of Boston College, holds an MA in history from the University of Massachusetts at Boston, and is currently a PhD candidate at Kansas State University. He is the author of numerous articles and military history publications. He has published several books including "Theater Logistics in the Gulf War" published by the Army Materiel Command in 1994, "The Brigade: A History" published by the US Army Combat Studies Institute (CSI) in 2005; and "Crossing the Line of Departure," also published by CSI in 2006. HE served as the general editor of the published proceedings from CSI's 20054 Military History Symposium, "An Army at War: Change in the Midst of Conflict." Aside from a general interest in things military and historical, his areas of particular interest include modern military operations, the German army in World War II, August 1914, and the Union Army in the Civil War. He also has a keen interest in ancient history, historical linguistics, the city of Boston, and baseball. McGrath is also a current PhD candidate at Kansas State University.